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Abstract
We obtain a closed-form solution to rational expectations equilibrium with
transaction costs in the framework of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) [On the
impossibility of informationally efficient markets. American Economic Re-
view 70, 543-566]. Individual private information incorporated into prices is
reduced due to suppressed trading activities by transaction costs. The equi-
librium fraction of informed traders increases (decreases) with transaction
costs when the costs are low (high). The informativeness of prices decreases
with transaction costs.
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1. Introduction
In rational expectations models, prices convey information. When traders
are asymmetrically informed in financial markets, the information is trans-
mitted from informed traders to uninformed traders through prices, i.e. unin-
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formed traders learn from prices. Transaction costs suppress traders’ trading
activities, hence reduce the amount of individual private information incor-
porated into prices, which has consequences on information acquisition and
transmission in rational expectations equilibrium.
As is remarked in Barron and Karpoff (2004), “it is difficult to incorporate
transaction costs into rational expectations models”. This remark is true if
the transaction costs are fixed or proportional to the traded shares of the
risky asset. We adopt the quadratic form of transaction costs, and solve the
rational expectations equilibrium in closed form. Section 3.2 provides more
discussions about the adoption of quadratic form of transaction cost.
The purpose of this letter is twofold. First, we study the problem of how
the equilibrium fraction of informed traders depends on transaction costs. If
transaction costs are prohibitively high, no trader is willing to trade, hence
no one is interested in acquiring information. If the transaction costs are not
very high, transaction costs suppress trading activities, hence reduce individ-
ual private information incorporated into prices. This helps informed traders
to keep their relative informational advantages over the uninformed. Hence
traders have motives to acquire private information, resulting in a higher
fraction of informed traders than that without transaction costs. Conse-
quently, we expect to see that the equilibrium fraction of informed traders is
not a monotonic function of transaction costs. To be specific, we will see that
when transaction costs are low (high), the equilibrium fraction of informed
traders is an increasing (decreasing) function of transaction costs.
The second point of this letter is to study the informativeness of equi-
librium prices in the presence of transaction costs, which depends on three
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factors. The first is how much individual private information is incorporated
into prices, and the second is how many traders acquire information, i.e. the
equilibrium fraction of informed traders. The third is the random supply of
risky asset provided by the noise traders.1 We will only focus on the first two
factors. When the transaction costs are high, both the fraction of informed
traders and the individual private information revealed through prices are
low. So we expect to see the informativeness of equilibrium prices is low
with high transaction costs. When the transaction costs are not very high,
a larger fraction of traders acquire information, as was pointed out earlier,
with each revealing a reduced amount of private information compared with
the case without transaction costs. We will see that the net effect is reduced
informativeness of equilibrium prices.
This letter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we solve the rational
expectations equilibrium with quadratic transaction costs in the framework
of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We discuss in Section 3 and conclude in
Section 4.
2. Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Transaction Costs
In this section, we will focus on the effect of the suppressed optimal
change in stock position due to quadratic transaction costs on information
transmission and information acquisition in the framework of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980). Because there are no market makers in Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980), we cannot include the behavior of the players who receive transaction
1We assume that this random supply is not affected by transaction costs.
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costs within the framework of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), and we have
to take them as exogenous. Further discussions about the endogeneity of
transaction costs is provided in Section 3.1.
As is in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the random payoff for the stock is
u˜ = θ˜ + ˜, where θ˜ and ˜ are normal random variables with expectations
θ and 0, and variances σ2θ and σ
2
 , respectively. Moreover, θ˜ and ˜ are not
correlated. There is a continuum of informed and uninformed traders in the
market with a total number of 1. A fraction λ of the traders is informed
indexed by i ∈ [0, λ], and the rest 1 − λ is uninformed indexed by j ∈
(λ, 1]. Informed traders can observe θ˜ directly by paying a fixed cost c,
and uninformed traders can only observe the price Pλ, where the subscript
denotes that the price is for a given value of λ. Both types of traders have
the same initial wealth W0 composed of the same cash amount M and the
same X shares of stock. Besides these two types of traders, there are noise
traders who trade for reasons not modeled in this paper. Their role is to
provide a random supply x˜ of risky asset to the market, which is a normal
variable with mean zero and variance σ2x. Moreover, the random variable x˜
is independent from θ˜ and ˜. We also assume that transaction costs have no
effect on noise traders’ trading behavior.
In the case with quadratic transaction costs, when one trader changes her
stock holding from X to a new position X, she has to pay transaction costs
1
2
t (X − X)2, where t is a positive constant. We have the end-of-day wealth
for the ith informed trader and the jth uninformed trader
W˜Ii = W0 + (u˜ − Pλ)XIi − 1
2
t (XIi − X)2 − c, i ∈ [0, λ],
W˜Uj = W0 + (u˜ − Pλ)XUj − 1
2
t (XUj − X)2, j ∈ (λ, 1],
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where XIi and XUj are the i
th informed trader’s and the jth uninformed
trader’s stock position, respectively. The informed traders base their deci-
sions on their direct observation of θ˜, and the uninformed traders can only
base their decisions on the observation of the price Pλ. The maximization
problems for the informed and uninformed traders are
max
XIi
E[− exp(−a W˜Ii) |θ ], max
XUj
E[− exp(−a W˜Uj) |Pλ ].
We solve for the optimal stock positions XIi and XUj
XIi =
θ − Pλ + tX
a σ2 + t
, XUj =
E[u˜|Pλ] − Pλ + tX
aVar(u˜|Pλ) + t . (1)
It becomes transparent to rewrite (1) as
XIi − X = (θ − Pλ
a σ2
− X)/(1 + t
a σ2
), (2)
XUj − X = (E[u˜|Pλ] − Pλ
aVar(u˜|Pλ) − X)/(1 +
t
aVar(u˜|Pλ)). (3)
We immediately see that the numerators in (2) and (3) are optimal changes
in stock positions in absence of transaction costs, and the denominators are
greater than 1 due to transaction costs.
We also obtain the maximal certainty equivalents for informed and unin-
formed traders
CE∗I = W0 −
1
2
tX
2
+
1
2
(θ − Pλ + tX)2
t + a σ2
− c, (4)
CE∗U = W0 −
1
2
tX
2
+
1
2
(E[u˜|Pλ] − Pλ + tX)2
t + aVar(u˜|Pλ) . (5)
The market clearing condition is∫ λ
0
XIi di +
∫ 1
λ
XUj dj = X + x˜. (6)
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This enables us to find the equilibrium price and strategies for informed and
uninformed traders for a given value of λ, and we have the following result.
Proposition 1. For a give fraction λ of informed traders, the trading strate-
gies for informed and uninformed traders are
XIi = α
−1(θ − Pλ + tX), (7)
XUj = A (θ − Pλ + tX + λ
α
σ2θ
σ2x
X),
A−1 = α + a σ2θ +
λ
α
σ2θ
σ2x
, α ≡ a σ2 + t.
Pλ = Λ
λ
α
[z˜ + (t − α
λ
)X +
1− λ
λ
αB], z˜ ≡ θ˜ − x˜
λ/α
, (8)
Λ−1 =
λ
α
+ (1 − λ)A, B = A (θ + tX + λ
α
σ2θ
σ2x
X).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
The quantity that is of interest to our problem is z˜ = θ˜ − x˜
λ/α
, which is
informationally equivalent to the price Pλ. The ratio λ/α can be regarded as
a measure of how much total private information is aggregated into prices.
The larger this ratio is, the more private information is aggregated into prices,
hence prices are less affected by the noise traders. From (7) we can see that
the value of α measures an informed trader’s responsiveness to her private
information. The more responsive the trading behavior is, the more private
information is incorporated into prices. This quantity reflects how much an
individual’s private information is revealed to the uninformed traders through
prices. The value of α is larger in the presence of transaction costs than that
without transaction costs, which means that the existence of transaction
costs suppresses an informed trader’s activity, resulting in a reduced amount
of individual private information incorporated into prices.
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The informativeness of prices also depends on the value of λ. Clearly,
the larger the fraction of informed traders is, the more private information
is aggregated into prices.
To study the informativeness of equilibrium prices in the presence of
transaction costs, we need to know how the equilibrium fraction of informed
traders λ depends on t. For this purpose, we need the following result which
will be used to determine the equilibrium fraction of informed traders in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 2. For a given value of λ, the ratio γ(λ) of ex ante expected
utilities between the informed and uninformed traders is
γ(λ) =
E[U(CE∗I )]
E[U(CE∗U)]
= ea c
√
α
α + (1 − ξ) a σ2θ
, ξ =
σ2θ
σ2θ +
α2
λ2
σ2x
, (9)
which is a monotone increasing function of λ.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.
We note that the utility is a negative value, so γ(λ) < 1 means that the
expected utility for the informed is higher than that for the uninformed. The
smaller this ratio γ(λ) is, the higher the informed traders’ ex ante expected
utility is. The ratio γ(λ) is a measure of informed traders’ informational
advantages over the uninformed. We are interested in how transaction costs
affect this informational advantage and we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Given informed fraction λ, when σ2θ > (
a σ2
λ
)2 σ2x, γ(λ) de-
creases (resp. increases) with t for t < (resp. >) t1 ≡ λσθσx − a σ2 . When
σ2θ ≤ (a σ
2

λ
)2 σ2x, γ(λ) is a monotone increasing function of t.
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Remark 1. Note that (a σ
2

λ
)2 σ2x is a measure of informativeness of prices in
absence of transaction costs as can be seen from z˜ in (8). When σ2θ ≤
(a σ
2

λ
)2 σ2x, i.e. the informativeness of prices in absence of transaction costs is
poor, no matter how small transaction costs are, they always hurt informed
traders’ informational advantages over the uninformed.
Remark 2. When σ2θ > (
a σ2
λ
)2 σ2x, i.e. the informativeness of prices in ab-
sence of transaction costs is good, transaction costs enhance (hurt) informed
traders’ informational advantages over uninformed traders when t is low
(high). This has important implications to the dependence of the equilibrium
fraction of informed traders on transaction costs in Corollary 2.
This can be understood intuitively as follows. On the one hand, informed
traders trade less aggressively due to transaction costs, resulting in less pri-
vate information incorporated into prices and less informativeness of prices
to the uninformed. Uninformed traders suffer from reduced informativeness
of prices in addition to transaction costs. Corollary 1 shows that uninformed
traders suffer more than the informed when transaction costs are low, which
implies that informed traders’ informational advantages over the uninformed
are enhanced by low transaction costs. On the other hand, when transaction
costs are high, informed traders cannot effectively exploit their informational
advantages. In other words, the gain from informational advantages cannot
compensate for transaction costs paid, resulting in informed traders’ infor-
mational advantages being hurt by transaction costs.
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium price Pλ in (8) for given values
of λ. Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), we define overall equilibrium
to be a pair (λ, Pλ), where Pλ is given in (8), such that the expected utility
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of the informed is equal to that of the uninformed if 0 < λ < 1; λ = 0 (resp.
λ = 1) if the expected utility of the informed is less (resp. greater) than that
of the uninformed at P0 (resp. P1).
Proposition 3. If γ(1) < 1 (resp. γ(0) > 1), then (1, P1) (resp. (0, P0)) is
an overall equilibrium. If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, γ(λ) = 1, then (λ, Pλ) is an overall equi-
librium with Pλ given in (8). Moreover, γ(λ) = 1 determines the equilibrium
value of λ
λ2 =
σ2x
σ2θ
α (
a σ2θ
exp(2 a c) − 1 − α). (10)
Proof. The first two sentences follow from the definition of overall equilib-
rium. Equation (10) is proved in Appendix B.
Remark 3. Note that
a σ2θ
exp(2 a c)−1 ≤ α is equivalent to γ(0) ≥ 1, hence when the
right hand side of (10) is negative due to large transaction costs, low quality
of private information or high information cost, the overall equilibrium is
(0, P0). Similarly, when the right hand side of (10) is greater than 1, the
overall equilibrium is (1, P1)
In the following, we focus our attention on the case 0 < λ < 1. Now we
are ready to answer the question of how transaction costs affect the equilib-
rium fraction of informed traders. From (10) we immediately see that the
equilibrium value of λ2 is a quadratic function of α, hence it is a quadratic
function of transaction costs. The value of λ2 increases with transaction
costs when t is below the critical value tc ≡ a ( σ
2
θ/2
exp(2 a c)−1 − σ2 ). This can be
understood from Corollary 1 and Remark 2. Suppressed trading activities
due to transaction costs by informed traders reduce their private information
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incorporated into prices. This helps the informed traders hide their private
information, and thence keep their informational advantages over the unin-
formed traders. This encourages more traders to acquire private information,
which results in an increased fraction of informed traders.
When the transaction cost is larger than the critical value tc, the equi-
librium value of λ2 is a decreasing function of transaction costs. This can
also be understood from Corollary 1 and Remark 2. With a large value of
transaction cost, the gain from informational advantages cannot compensate
for transaction costs. Hence the traders are discouraged to acquire private
information, which results in a reduced fraction of informed traders. In the
extreme case when the transaction costs is forbiddingly high, the traders
will not trade at all no matter how good information they have, hence they
have no interest in acquiring private information. We summarize the above
discussion in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. The equilibrium fraction of informed traders λ increases (de-
creases) with transaction costs when t < tc (t > tc).
We also want to answer the question of how the informativeness of equilib-
rium prices depends on transaction costs. From (8), we see that the random
variable z˜ = θ˜ − x˜
λ/α
is informationally equivalent to the price Pλ. The
informativeness of the price Pλ is measured by the variance of the noise term
in z˜
σ2x
λ2/α2
=
α
a σ2θ
exp(2 a c)− 1 − α
σ2θ , (11)
which is an increasing function of α, hence an increasing function of trans-
action costs. This says that the equilibrium price becomes less informative
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with the presence of transaction costs than that in the absence of transac-
tion costs. This is consistent with our intuition. We summarize this in the
following corollary.
Corollary 3. The informativeness of the equilibrium price is a decreasing
function of transaction costs.
3. Discussions
3.1. Endogeneity of Transaction Costs
In this letter, the transaction cost parameter t is exogenous as is treated
in most papers on transaction costs in finance literature like Constantinides
(1986), Lo et al. (2004), Liu (2004) and Liu and Loewenstein (2002). Because
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) does not include market maker, if we want to
limit our problem with transaction costs within the framework of Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), we have to take transaction costs as exogenously given.
However, whenever one studies a problem with transaction costs, there
always arises the natural question where the paid transaction costs go in the
economy. Hence the full description of a problem with transaction costs must
model the behavior of players who receive the transaction costs. Recently
Liu and Wang (2011) endogenizes transaction costs in rational expectations
equilibrium, which motivates us to endogenize our transaction cost parameter
t in a similar manner in a future work. Along this line, the noise traders’
behavior might also need to be modeled, as is done in Liu and Wang (2011).
Because of the information cost in our model, an even fuller description
of our problem should model the behavior of information providers, who can
either trade on their own information or sell information to other investors.
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3.2. Quadratic Specification of Transaction Costs
Fixed and Proportional transaction costs are widely studied in the lit-
erature, and we only list a few of them, Constantinides (1986), Liu and
Loewenstein (2002), Liu (2004) and Lo et al. (2004). Garleanu and Pedersen
(2011) offers micro-foundations for the quadratic form of transaction costs.
They derive in closed form the optimal dynamic portfolio policy when trad-
ing is costly and security returns are predictable. Heaton and Lucas (1996)
also use quadratic transaction costs to study the effect of transaction costs
on equity premium in incomplete markets. They numerically compare the re-
sults calculated with quadratic and proportional transaction costs, and they
find that the results are qualitatively similar.
3.3. Property due to Quadratic Specification
We believe the following property of our solution is due to the quadratic
specification of transaction costs. In absence of transaction costs, when σ2
vanishes, the equilibrium fraction λ of informed traders vanishes. Meanwhile,
λ does not vanish in the presence of quadratic transaction costs which can be
seen from (10). The following is the reason. When σ2 vanishes, i.e. informed
traders obtain perfect information about the return of stock, informed traders
will buy (sell) as much as possible as long as the expected profit is positive
(negative). Then the private information is fully incorporated into prices,
and uninformed traders can learn as well from prices about the return of
the stock as informed traders. This discourages informed traders to acquire
costly information resulting in a vanishing value of λ.
However, this vanishing value of λ will not happen in the presence of
quadratic transaction costs. Quadratic transaction costs prevent informed
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traders from buying or selling an infinite amount of stock, which prevents
prices from being fully revealing. The acquisition of private information
remains to be valuable even when the private information is perfect. Conse-
quently, a non-vanishing equilibrium value of λ results when σ2 vanishes, as
can be seen from (10).
4. Conclusions
We study the problem of how transaction costs affect information trans-
mission and acquisition in rational expectations equilibrium. We find that
in the presence of quadratic transaction costs, the equilibrium fraction of
informed traders is not a monotonic function of transaction costs. To be
specific, for small (large) transaction costs, the informed fraction increases
(decreases) with transaction costs. The informativeness of the equilibrium
price is a monotone decreasing function of transaction costs.
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A. Proof to Proposition 1
We postulate linear strategies for uninformed traders
XUj = −APλ + B, j ∈ [0, λ], (12)
where the constants A and B are to be determined. Plugging trading strate-
gies for informed traders (1) and the postulated linear strategies (12) for
uninformed traders into the market clearing condition (6), we solve for the
price
Pλ = Λ
λ
α
[z˜ + (t − α
λ
)X +
1− λ
λ
αB], (13)
Λ−1 ≡ λ
α
+ (1 − λ)A,
α ≡ a σ2 + t, z˜ ≡ θ˜ −
x˜
λ/α
.
From this we see that the price Pλ is informationally equivalent to the random
variable z˜. With price Pλ and its informational equivalent z˜, we obtain
E[u˜|Pλ] = E[u˜|z] = ξ z + (1 − ξ)θ, (14)
Var(u˜|Pλ) = σ2 + (1− ξ)σ2θ , ξ =
σ2θ
σ2θ +
α2
λ2
σ2x
. (15)
Express z˜ in terms of Pλ from (13), and substitute (14) and (15) into (1),
we can obtain XUj expressed in terms of the price Pλ. Now we are ready
to solve the constants A and B by comparison with the postulated strategy
(12)
B = A (θ + tX +
λ
α
σ2θ
σ2x
X), A−1 = α + a σ2θ +
λ
α
σ2θ
σ2x
(16)
We rewrite (12) as
XUj = A (θ − Pλ + tX + λ
α
σ2θ
σ2x
X) (17)
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B. Proof to Proposition 2 and 3
Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), we first calculate
E[− exp(− aCE∗I )|Pλ]
− exp[−a (W0 − 12 tX
2 − c)]
= E[exp(−1
2
a
(θ˜ − Pλ + tX)2
t + a σ2
)|Pλ]
Using formula (A21) in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
E[exp(−β v˜2)|w] = 1√
1 + 2 β
exp(− β
1 + 2 β
E[v˜|w]2),
and defining
β =
1
2
a
Var(θ˜|Pλ)
t + a σ2
, v˜ =
θ˜ − Pλ + tX√
Var(θ˜|Pλ)
,
we have
E[− exp(− aCE∗I )|Pλ]
− exp[−a(W0 − 12 tX
2 − c)]
=
√
t+ a σ2
t+ a σ2 + aVar(θ˜|Pλ)
× exp(−1
2
a
(E[u˜|Pλ]− Pλ + tX)2
t+ aVar(u˜|Pλ) ).
Recall (5) we obtain
E[− exp(− aCE∗I )|Pλ] = ea c
√
t+ a σ2
t+ a σ2 + aVar(θ˜|Pλ)
(− exp(− aCE∗U)).
Taking expectations on both sides gives
γ(λ) ≡ E[− exp(−aCE
∗
I )]
E[− exp(−aCE∗U)]
= ea c
√
t+ a σ2
t+ a σ2 + aVar(θ˜|Pλ)
= ea c
√
α
α + (1 − ξ)a σ2θ
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This gives (9) in Proposition 2. The equilibrium fraction λ of informed
traders is determined by the equality between the ex ante expected utilities
of informed and uninformed traders
ea c
√
α
α + (1 − ξ)a σ2θ
= 1.
The equilibrium fraction of informed traders λ is then given in (10) in Propo-
sition 3.
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